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Critical Study of Wayne Davis’s Conversational Implicature: Intention and 
Convention in the Failure of Gricean Theory 
In his recent book, Implicature: Intention, Convention, and Principle in the Failure of 
Gricean Theory (1998), Wayne Davis argues that the Gricean approach to 
conversational implicature is bankrupt and offers a new approach of his 
own.  Although I disagree with Davis both in general and in detail, I think nonetheless 
that the problems he raises'or close relatives of them-- are serious and important 
problems which should give any Gricean pause.  This is an extremely worthwhile 
book, even for those who disagree with it.   
The first prong of Davis' attack on Gricean theory is a series of arguments designed to 
show that Grice cannot accommodate the role of speaker intention in conversational 
implicature generation.  I think these arguments fail to accomplish this goal, because I 
think Davis is wrong about the role of speaker intention.  Nonetheless, many of the 
more specific objections that Davis raises as a part of this general argument are 
important and damaging to Grice, though not quite in the way that Davis takes them 
to be.  (I'll focus here on the problem of indeterminate implicatures.)  However, Davis' 
own theory turns out to fare equally badly, as his way around these difficulties 
depends crucially on the (in my opinion) deeply problematic role he assigns to 
speaker intention. 
The second prong of Davis' attack is to argue that Grice cannot accommodate the role 
of convention in conversational implicature generation.  My response to this argument 
is quite different.  I agree with Davis about the role of convention in implicature 
generation, but I take the Gricean story to be largely able to accommodate this.  There 
is a point, however, at which the role of convention does pose problems for 
Grice.  This might seem to give Davis the upper hand.  However, it seems to me that 
Davis' own view fares no better at this point. Nonetheless, the problem raised is a 
serious one'for both Grice and Davis'and one which needs to be answered. 
Davis on Grice
Davis' goal is to argue that Grice's theory of conversational implicature, and any 
theory which shares its central tenets, must fail.  It will be useful, then, if I start by 
stating what Davis takes to be the central tenets of Grice's theory. 
(1) What Davis calls the Theoretical Definition of 'conversational implicature'.  (I'll 
follow him in this from here on.) I quote Grice's own words rather than Davis' slightly 
altered rendition.  (Davis takes the various formulations of this, including his, in the 
literature to be pretty much equivalent (13), so it seems legitimate for me to use 
Grice's own version. And it will be useful to me to have Grice's own words at hand 
later on.) 
A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that p has implicated that q, 
may be said to have conversationally implicated that q, provided that 
(1) he is presumed to be following the conversational maxims, or at least the 
Cooperative Principle;  
(2) the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, q is required to make his 
saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in those terms) consistent with this 
presumption; and  
(3) the speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks) 
that it is within the competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the 
supposition mentioned in (2) is required.  (Grice 1989: 30-31.) 
(2) The Calculability Assumption.  Davis renders this as 'conversational implicatures 
can always be worked out or inferred from the conversational principles.' (Davis: 1.) 
(3) The Generative Assumption.  This holds that fulfilment of the three necessary 
conditions listed in the Theoretical Definition is sufficient for implicature.  (This is 
not Davis' own formulation, but I find this more straightforward than his. I take 
nothing to hang on this.) 
(4) Grice's Razor, 'which holds that it is more economical to postulate conversational 
implicatures rather than senses because conversational implicatures can be derived 
from independently motivated principles.' (Davis: 1.)  
I am largely in agreement with Davis as to the central tenets of Grice's theory, 
although I am not happy'for reasons that will become clear later'with his formulation 
of calculability, and'again, this will be discussed more later'I'm not sure that Grice's 
Razor should be taken to be a central tenet.  However, when Davis begins his detailed 
discussion of Grice's theory, some important claims are added to this picture which 
are not in Grice, and not'I think'ones a Gricean should feel compelled to 
accept.  These claims are those involved in Davis' definitions of speaker implicature 
and sentence implicature. 
Davis distinguishes two sorts of conversational implicatures, speaker implicatures and 
sentence implicatures.  Speaker implicatures, according to Davis, are those claims 
which the speaker means or implies by saying something else.  (Davis: 5.)  Since what 
a speaker means, for Grice, is a matter of speaker intentions, speaker implicature is a 
matter of speaker intentions. 'Sentence implicature' is defined in terms of speaker 
implicature: '[a] sentence implicates, roughly, what speakers using the sentence with 
its regular meaning would commonly use it to implicate.'  (Davis: 6.)  Because 
speaker implicature is a matter of intentions and sentence implicature a matter of 
community-wide conventions, speakers may implicate claims that their sentences 
don't implicate and sentences may implicate claims that their utterers don't 
implicate.  Davis takes speaker implicature to be Grice's particularised implicature, 
and sentence implicature to be Grice's generalised implicature.  (Davis: 21.)   
The role of intention 
Davis argues that the central tenets of Gricean theory are in conflict with the role of 
speaker intention in determining speaker implicature.  This is absolutely 
right.  Speaker implicature is a matter of speaker intentions, and conversational 
implicature'according to Grice's Theoretical Definition-- is not.  In fact, speaker 
intentions are nowhere mentioned in the definition.  Clause (1) concerns the 
audience's presumption that the speaker is cooperative, Clause (2) what the audience 
is required to believe, and Clause (3) what the speaker believes about the 
audience.  Grice's Theoretical Definition is, as Davis argues, completely inappropriate 
to speaker implicature.   
If speaker implicature were Grice's notion, this would indeed be a devastating 
criticism of Grice's theory.  It seems to me, however, that it is not.  I think it is far 
from clear that Davis is right in attributing these notions to Grice.  First, and least 
significantly, the definition Davis gives of 'speaker implicature' is not one that Grice 
ever explicitly gives or endorses. This alone does not mean that it is not his definition, 
of course, and it is a natural definition to draw out of certain passages in Grice. [1] A 
clear piece of evidence that Grice would not have accepted this definition comes from 
the fact that Grice allows for the possibility of implicating by making as if to say, 
rather than by saying (as in clause (1) quoted above).  For Grice, meaning that P is a 
necessary condition for saying that P. [2]   One who utters a sentence standardly used 
to say that P [3] but actually means that Q only makes as if to say that P.  This is what 
allows irony, in which one certainly does not mean what's generally meant by the 
sentence one utters, to be analysed as implicature.  Since Grice allows for this 
possibility, it is, it seems to me, not right to attribute to him the claim that what is 
implicated is simply what is meant but not said by what one says. [4] 
But this is not the only reason to resist the attribution of this view to Grice.  A very 
important reason is that Grice is not hesitant about discussing what speakers mean or 
intend, but these notions are notably absent from his discussion of implicature. [5] 
  Instead, the focus tends to be on the audience-oriented aspect of his Theoretical 
Definition.  Take, for example, Grice's brief summary of the notion (1989: 86): 'what 
is implicated is what it is required that one assume a speaker to think in order to 
preserve the assumption that he is following the Cooperative Principle (and perhaps 
some conversational maxims as well), if not at the level of what is said, at least at the 
level of what is implicated.'  There is nothing at all in this brief summary about what 
the speaker means'the focus is exclusively on what the audience needs to 
assume.  Given this sort of emphasis, it seems inappropriate to attribute to Grice the 
view that speaker implicature is what the speaker means by saying something else.   
It becomes even less appealing to attribute this view to Grice when we consider some 
of its consequences.  Consider a variant on an example that Davis gives on page 
74.  Albert tells Bettina that he feels sick.  Bettina replies with 'I'll go find an 
aspirin'.  Unbeknownst to Albert, what Bettina means by this is that there are aliens 
nearby, probably causing Albert's illness, and he should flee.  (Bettina likes to protect 
herself from the aliens by holding an aspirin in front of her, and so she thinks that 
mentioning that she's going to find an aspirin is a good way to warn Albert.  Albert 
knows nothing of Bettina's beliefs about aliens.)  There is, it seems to me, little 
temptation to say that Bettina has implicated that Albert should flee.  But on Davis' 
account this is just what she has done.  By saying, 'I'll go find an aspirin', Bettina 
meant that Albert should flee, and this is precisely what it is for her to implicate it. 
What Davis has lost is the normative dimension of conversational implicature.  On 
Grice's own account, speakers can't simply implicate whatever they mean by saying 
something else: Clauses (1) and (2) of the Theoretical Definition prevent this. [6] 
  Bettina did not implicate that Albert should flee, because Albert did not need to 
assume that she thought this in order to understand her as cooperative.  (In other 
words, Clause (2) fails.)  This seems a desirable result.  What Grice's theory gives us 
and Davis' does not is the idea that what is implicated is not wholly up to the 
speaker.  This is importantly parallel to Grice's notion of saying.  For all Grice's focus 
speaker intentions, what is said is not left completely up to the speaker'if the speaker 
chooses the wrong sentence (as with malapropism and mistranslation), she will not 
manage to say what she is trying to say.  Grice's treatment of implicature yields the 
same sort of result'speakers like Bettina have chosen the wrong means for their 
intended implicatures, and as a result they don't succeed in implicating.   
I've suggested that we needn't, and shouldn't, suppose that everything which is meant 
by what is said is conversationally implicated.  In addition, I've suggested that the 
constraints on implicature placed by Grice's theoretical definition serve an important 
purpose.  But this means that Davis is simply wrong about the role of intention in 
implicature.  Davis' speaker implicature is indeed incompatible with Grice's 
Theoretical Definition, but'I think-- we should view this as a reason to reject Davis' 
speaker implicature (at least as a part of Gricean theory), and with it the role that he 
assigns to speaker intentions. [7] 
Indeterminate Implicatures 
If am right about the above, Davis' claim that Gricean theory cannot accommodate the 
role of intention in implicature is wrong.  But he argues for this claim by discussing a 
wide variety of cases, and some of these cases are still seriously problematic for Grice, 
even if not'it seems to me'in the way that Davis takes them to be.  A prime example of 
this comes from Davis' discussion of Grice on indeterminate implicatures.   
Grice suggests in 'Logic and Conversation' that some implicatures may be (at least to 
some degree) indeterminate.   
Since, to calculate a conversational implicature is to calculate what has to be supposed 
in order to preserve the supposition that the Cooperative Principle is being observed, 
and since there may be various possible specific explanations, a list of which may be 
open, the conversational implicatum in such cases will be a disjunction of such 
specific explanations; and if the list of these is open, the implicatum will have just the 
same kind of indeterminacy that many actual implicata do in fact seem to 
possess.  (39-40.) 
It has been suggested (by Martinich among others) that the implicatures involved in 
metaphor are best understood as indeterminate implicatures.  The most important 
problem Davis raises for this view is that it's very implausible to suppose that the 
utterer of a metaphor actually means to convey something as weak as a disjunctive 
proposition.  Davis notes that the poet who says 'my love is a red rose' does not mean 
my love is beautiful or sweet-smelling or highly-valued.  He rightly points out that the 
poet would not be pleased by one who replies with 'yes, that's true'she does smell 
good, despite being ugly and worthless.' (Davis 70-72.)  In addition, Davis claims that 
Clause (2) of Grice's characterisation fails: 'There is no belief the speaker is required 
to possess.' (72.) 
I think that Davis is onto a very important problem for Grice, one that is not easily 
solved'and one that is not confined to metaphor.  But I also think that there are some 
problems with the way that Davis has characterised the situation.  First, and least 
importantly, Clause (2) of Grice's characterisation is not concerned with what beliefs 
speakers are required to possess.  Rather, its topic is what beliefs audiences are 
required to attribute to speakers. Next, Davis' argument against the claim that the 
speaker means the disjunctive belief is a bit weak'the mere fact that the poet would be 
displeased by someone insulting his love can't prove anything about what the poet 
meant.  One may mean a disjunction, and still be displeased by having someone agree 
by affirming the opposites of two of the disjuncts, even if the topic is not one's love 
life, and even if the 'agreement' is not a response to one's poem.   
Neither of these problems is devastating, or even serious, however.  Although Clause 
(2) doesn't fail in quite the way Davis takes it to fail, it still fails'there's no one belief 
that the audience is required to attribute to the speaker.  And although Davis' 
argument that the poet doesn't mean the disjunction is weak, it is still unlikely that 
speakers do mean such disjunctive claims.   
These points become even clearer, I think, with a different example.  Suppose that I 
am asked to write a letter of reference for Claudette.  I write only, 'I cannot 
recommend Claudette highly enough.' [8]   There are at least two ways to explain my 
apparent violation of the maxim of quantity'thus giving rise to a situation like that 
which Grice discusses in the passage above.  Either Claudette is so wonderful that I 
cannot find adequate words of praise, or she is so lacking that I don't feel I can give a 
sufficiently positive recommendation for the job.  What I mean to convey is the 
former, but there is nothing to indicate this to the audience.  It has not occurred to me 
that my utterance could be taken to suggest anything but the praise I intend.  It seems 
clear, in this case, that (a) there is no one belief the audience must attribute to me in 
order to understand me as cooperative'(2) does indeed fail; and (b) I do not mean the 
disjunctive implicature that either Claudette is so wonderful that I cannot find 
adequate words of praise, or she is so lacking that I don't feel I can give a sufficiently 
positive recommendation for the job.   
So far, we have seen two problematic facts about this sort of case.  First, there seems 
to be no one belief the audience is required to attribute to me.  Second, I don't mean 
the disjunctive claim that Grice suggests would be implicated in such a case.  These 
are, intuitively, worrying facts; and they are problems for Grice on Davis' 
understanding.  It's not, however, clear yet that they are genuinely problems for 
Grice.  First, Grice's discussion of indeterminate implicatures gives us a single claim 
as implicature in these cases'the disjunctive one'and this claim is therefore the one that 
the audience is required to attribute (rather than either of its disjuncts).  Second, it is 
genuinely unclear whether Grice took being meant by the speaker to be a necessary 
condition for being a conversational implicature.  He may well have done so, but the 
only place in which he states this explicitly is a passage in 'The Causal Theory of 
Perception' which he chose to omit when he collected his papers for Studies in the 
Way of Words. [9]    
But variants of these problems remain, even if we are as strict as possible in our 
interpretation of Grice. 
(1) It seems completely implausible to suppose that any audience could be required to 
attribute the disjunctive belief (either Claudette's great or she's awful) to me in order 
to understand me as cooperative.  (In fact, this would be worse than useless to the 
project of trying to understand me as cooperative!)  So Grice's Clause (2) fails.   
(2) Even if we don't assume that being meant is a necessary condition for being 
implicated, Clause (3) in Grice's characterisation'the clause concerned with the 
speaker's beliefs'fails to hold.  I certainly don't think that my audience can work out 
that either Claudette is so wonderful that I cannot find adequate words of praise, or 
she is so lacking that I don't feel I can give a sufficiently positive recommendation for 
the job.  It hasn't occurred to me that my utterance could be taken as anything but 
praise, and I wouldn't have made the utterance if it had. 
So it turns out that what Grice says about indeterminate conversational implicatures 
conflicts quite strongly with what he says about conversational implicatures more 
generally.   
Worse yet, indeterminate implicatures are not an isolated, rare 
phenomenon.  Implicatures which are indeterminate in the strongest sense'those Grice 
would take to be open disjunctions'are actually, it seems to me, the norm.  Consider 
the standard reference letter example, in which I give an unflattering reference for 
Desmond's philosophy job application by writing 'Desmond uses lovely fonts', and 
nothing else.  Possible implicatures include any of the following: You should not hire 
Desmond; Desmond's a poor philosopher; I don't think well of Desmond'  The 
audience for my letter could understand me as cooperative by attributing any of these 
beliefs to me.  According to Grice on indeterminate implicatures, then, the implicature 
carried by my letter will be Either you should not hire Desmond; or Desmond's a poor 
philosopher; or I don't think well of Desmond'  But in order to meet Grice's necessary 
conditions for conversational implicature, I'd have to believe that my audience could 
work this out (Clause 3), and my audience would have to be required to work this out 
(Clause 2).  Neither of these is likely to obtain, given the open nature of the 
disjunction. [10]   Highly indeterminate implicatures, then, arise even in what should 
be the simplest cases.  And they pose serious problems, even in these cases. 
On Davis' own preferred account, most of the problems resulting from indeterminate 
implicatures simply do not arise.  His account is a simple one: speaker implicature is 
defined only as what speakers mean by saying something else.  The clauses of Grice's 
characterisation of implicature, as Davis rightly notes, have little bearing on this.  As 
a result, Davis does not take them to be necessary conditions for conversational 
implicature. What Grice says specifically about indeterminate implicatures is, as 
we've seen, deeply problematic.  Davis abandons this also.   
For Davis, then, most of the cases we've discussed need pose no special problem. It is 
difficult to say what is implicated by the poet's utterance of the red rose metaphor 
precisely to the extent that it's difficult to say what the poet means by it'if the poet 
means something specific by it, then the poet implicates something specific.  I do not 
implicate anything negative about Claudette with my ill-judged letter, because I did 
not mean anything negative by it.  The Desmond case, with its endless possible, 
closely related implicatures, is trickier.  But if mean some very specific 
proposition'say, that Desmond is a bad philosopher'then I implicate that very specific 
proposition, and no other.  If, however, what I mean is somewhat indeterminate'I 
really couldn't choose between the various possible negative implicatures'then what I 
implicate is genuinely indeterminate.  I see no reason to suppose that this sort of 
indeterminacy is any sort of a problem for Davis.  In fact, it seems rather a natural 
way of dealing with the case, and certainly preferable to the disjunctive implicature 
solution.  These cases, then, are not the problem for Davis that they are for Grice. 
But, as we have seen, Davis' account faces other problems'and we can actually see a 
hint of them in the solutions that he offers us to the indeterminacy cases.  I find it a bit 
unintuitive to say that the implicature generated by my Claudette letter is completely 
positive.  Similarly, it seems a bit strange to suppose that whether or not the Desmond 
case is one of indeterminacy will depend completely on whether I had a specific 
proposition in mind as the meaning of my utterance.  It also feels odd to say that the 
poet's implicature would be utterly determinate if the poet had some particular 
proposition in mind.  Nonetheless, we might be willing to accept these results.  The 
problem is that the very feature which yields these results is that which also leads to 
the much more damaging results we saw earlier.  Davis' account has abandoned the 
normative element of Gricean conversational implicature, and this is a significant loss. 
The role of convention
Davis discusses a wide variety of cases in which he claims that both Calculability and 
Clause (2) of the Theoretical Definition fail to hold, due to the role played in 
communication by implicature conventions.  This, he argues, shows the need to 
abandon Gricean theory in favour of his alternative account.  I will argue that he is 
wrong to suppose that the role of convention in implicature has this 
result.  Nonetheless, another convention-based problem Davis raises is indeed a 
problem. However, I will suggest, it is also a problem for Davis' account.  
Davis provides many examples of implicatures which seem to depend crucially on 
convention.  Our example here will be tautology implicatures'those arising from 
utterances like 'men are men', 'whatever will be will be', and 'war is war'.  These are 
commonly explained as arising from violations of the maxim of quantity.  The maxim 
of quantity demands that speakers give neither too much nor too little 
information.  The information actually expressed by a tautology is about as minimal 
as information gets, and unlikely to be of much use to anybody.  As a result of this 
flagrant violation of quantity at the level of what is said, Griceans argue, 
conversational implicatures are generated. 
Davis argues that the specific tautology implicatures which actually arise in English 
are not ones that audiences could work out.  Why, for example, does 'war is war' 
implicate that war is terrible while 'a war's a war' implicates that one war is much the 
same is another?  And why does the latter not carry the same sort of implicature as 'a 
deal's a deal'?  Cross-linguistic observations complicate things still further.  In order 
to achieve in French the standard implicature carried by 'war is war', one would need 
to use a sentence which means 'that is war'.  These observations, many of them drawn 
from the work of Wierzbicka, are interesting and significant: they show rather clearly 
that audiences cannot work out the implicatures from conversational principles 
alone.  According to Davis' understanding of calculability, then, these implicatures are 
not calculable.  For closely related reasons, Clause (2) seems as though it must go 
unsatisfied, as there is no one implicature which an audience is required to arrive at in 
order to uphold the assumption that the speaker is being cooperative. 
Tautology implicatures and others that seem to rely heavily on convention do not pose 
these problems for Davis.  Davis takes these implicatures to be sentence implicatures, 
where a sentence implicates, 'roughly, what speakers using the sentence with its 
regular meaning would commonly use it to implicate'.  (Davis: 6.)  Unsurprisingly, 
given this definition, convention plays a vital role in generating sentence 
implicatures.  (Davis' book contains an extensive discussion of the role and nature of 
implicature conventions.)  Moreover, Grice's necessary conditions and the 
calculability requirement don't apply to this sort of implicature. So the role of 
convention in implicature seems to serve as support rather than a problem for Davis' 
view. [11] 
It seems to me, however, that the same is true for Grice's view.  This is because 
Grice's view is not quite that which Davis attributes to him.  In particular, Grice's 
calculability requirement is crucially different from the one Davis attributes to 
him.  Davis' understanding, recall, is 'conversational implicatures can always be 
worked out or inferred from the conversational principles' (p. 1).  Grice, however, is 
quite explicit that conversational principles are not all that the audience has to draw 
on in working out implicatures.  (Grice 1989: 31.)  Rather, they also make use of 
background information, which'it seems to me'may perfectly well include information 
about community-wide conventions.  Once this information is allowed to enter into 
the audience's calculations, tautology implicatures become perfectly calculable.  With 
this information a part of the calculation, audiences also become much more restricted 
as to what hypotheses are reasonable to consider in trying to make sense of the 
speaker as cooperative.  Given the background information about historical 
conventions, it seems far more plausible to suppose that the audience might be 
required to assume the conventional tautology implicatures.  So neither Calculability 
nor Clause (2) need fail.  These apparent problems for Grice's view are not problems 
at all. 
Another problem Davis raises, however, is somewhat more difficult to deal 
with.  Davis rightly points out that Grice's Razor loses all plausibility once we take 
seriously the role of convention in calculating implicatures.  It no longer seems right 
to say that working out conversational implicatures requires fewer items of highly 
specific knowledge than disambiguation.  Ambiguity solutions and implicature 
solutions are pretty much on a par as far as knowledge of specific conventions 
goes.  So, if Grice's Razor is a central tenet of Grice's theory, then Grice's theory must 
go.  However, it doesn't seem obvious to me that Grice's Razor is a central tenet of his 
theory.  Grice first puts it forward after the original theory, and does so rather 
hesitantly:  'So, at least, so far as I can see (not far, I think), there is as yet no reason 
not to accept Modified Occam's Razor.'  (Grice 1989: 49.)  Certainly it is easy to 
imagine Gricean theory without the Razor, and this was indeed how Grice first 
imagined it himself.   
Still, there may be serious problems for Grice even if Grice's Razor is not a central 
tenet of his theory.  Grice's Razor is what gives us a reason to postulate generalised 
implicatures rather than ambiguities.  Without the Razor, why should we ever prefer a 
implicature explanation?  It is far from clear whether or not there is a satisfactory 
solution to this problem. 
It is also far from clear, as it turns out, that Davis can provide a satisfactory solution 
to this problem.  Grice's Razor is not a central tenet of Davis' theory.  Indeed, Davis 
opposes it.  But Davis has provided nothing to replace it, and he still faces the task of 
deciding when we should postulate an ambiguity and when an implicature. [12] 
  Davis' sentence implicatures, completely determined by convention, could easily be 
replaced by ambiguities.  With Grice's Razor abandoned, it seems to me that 
Davis'like Grice--  will have trouble providing a motivation for ever preferring to 
postulate an implicature.  So Davis is left with the same problem that faces Grice. 
Conclusion
In my view, Davis' attacks on Grice's theory of implicature do not succeed in showing 
it to be bankrupt.  Grice's theory is, I think, quite different from what Davis takes it to 
be, in important and worthwhile ways.  Nonetheless, the problems Davis raises are 
well worth serious consideration and many of them are not easily solved.  His book 
sets an agenda of problems to be solved by any theory of conversational implicature 
(including his own), and it deserves to be widely read. [13] 
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[1] Davis has the definition in quotation marks, but has told me in correspondence that he did not 
mean to be suggesting that the definition was a quotation from Grice.  Davis takes the definition from 
the passage in which Grice first introduces the term 'implicature': 'At this point, A might well inquire 
what B was implying, what he was suggesting, or even what he meant by saying that B had not yet 
been to prison'It is clear that whatever B implied, suggested, meant in this example, is distinct from 
what B said, which was simply that C had not been to prison yet. I wish to introduce, as terms of art, 
the verb implicate and the related nouns implicature (cf. implying) and implicatum (cf. what is 
implied).' His reading of this passage is not an unreasonable one, but as I argue above it seems 
inconsistent with other claims made by Grice.   
[2] This is one of the least intuitively appealing of Gricean doctrines.  I by no means favour its 
endorsement.  But the fact that Grice did is important to arriving at an accurate understanding of Grice. 
[3] I'm ignoring all sorts of complications regarding sentences containing indexicals.  Grice never 
worked these out satisfactorily, and it would only complicate things unnecessarily to try to discuss 
these matters. 
[4] The saying-implies-meaning thesis is not explicitly stated in 'Logic and Conversation', although it I 
take it to be implicit in Grice's use of 'making as if to say', particularly when discussing irony.  It is 
explicit in his 'Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning', first published in 
1968.  (Grice 1968: 227-229; Grice 1989: 120-122.)  It also appears in the 1989 version of 'Utterer's 
Meaning and Intentions' (Grice 1989: 87), although not in the 1969 version of this paper.  I'm grateful 
to Wayne Davis for discussion of these textual matters. 
[5] With one exception: in 'The Causal Theory of Perception', Grice says that implicatures must be 
meant.  He chose to omit this part of the paper for Studies in the Way of Words (one of very few such 
omissions), so its status is not clear.  The reason Grice gives for this omission is that the view presented 
there is 'substantially the same' as that presented in his later papers, which contain fuller discussions. 
(Grice 1989: 229) Since this passage is actually a notable departure from other statements of the view, 
it is hard to know how to treat it: it does not seem plausible to suppose that Grice changed his mind, as 
he wouldn't then say that the view is substantially the same.  Nor does it seem plausible to suppose he 
still held the view, since if that were the case he would surely wish it to be stated somewhere.  But even 
if the status of the claim were clear, it would only establish that being meant is a necessary condition 
for implicature, and this is much weaker than Davis' claim. 
[6] Strictly speaking, this isn't quite right.  These clauses only prevent speakers from conversationally 
implicating whatever they like.  But conventional implicature is determined entirely by linguistic 
meaning; and Grice's third, briefly sketched category of non-conversational non-conventional 
implicature is meant to work just like conversational implicature except for the use of different 
maxims.  So linguistic meaning would prevent speakers from conventionally implicating whatever they 
like, while analogues of clauses (1) and (2) would prevent them from non-conventionally non-
conversationally implicating whatever they like. 
[7] This is not to say that Davis' speaker implicature isn't a useful and worthwhile notion. What I'm 
concerned with here is whether it can be attributed to Grice'in particular, whether there is such strong 
evidence in favour of this attribution that we should make it even though the view we end up with is, as 
Davis compellingly argues, clearly internally incoherent. I think we should not. But the notion of 
speaker implicature, taken on its own terms (rather than attributed to Grice), is certainly a useful one 
for discussion of communication.   
[8] This sentence (with a different name) is one that I actually read in a letter of 
reference. 
[9] For more on this, see footnote 5. 
[10] Davis also notes that open disjunctions are especially problematic for clause 2 
[11] Not all of what Davis says about sentence implicature in his book seems 
consistent, and much of it also seems different from Grice's generalised 
implicature.  In addition to the definition quoted above, he says that 'facts about a 
particular context or speaker will never play a role in deriving a sentence 
implicature'.  (Davis: 27.)  This is importantly different from Grice's generalised 
implicature.  For Grice, generalised implicatures are ones that are usually carried by 
utterances of some particular form of words.  The important difference between these 
two notions is that, for Grice, a sentence which usually carries some implicature may 
fail to do so; for Davis, that sentence will always carry the implicature.  But Davis, 
like Grice, wants to distinguish between conventional and conversational 
implicature.  The key to this distinction, for Davis, is that conversational implicatures 
depend on context and are cancellable.  (Davis: 8-9.)  Davis' sentence implicature is 
meant to be a species of conversational implicature, but it cannot be according to the 
definition that Davis gives: what a sentence implicates is simply a matter of that 
sentence, and 'facts about a particular context or speaker will never play a role in 
deriving a sentence implicature'.  (Davis: 27.)  In correspondence, Davis tells me that 
he distinguishes (in a forthcoming work) between sentence implicature'which is 
independent of context and applied sentence implicature'which depends in part on 
context.  This distinction will be an important one to properly understanding sentence 
implicature, and in particular the cancellability of sentence implicatures.   
[12] Davis does discuss issues of ambiguity Vs implicature, but he does not provide a 
methodological principle which can do work analogous to that which Grice's Razor is 
meant to do for Grice's theory. 
[13] I am very grateful to Wayne Davis, Chris Hookway, Maria Kasmirli, Teresa Robertson, and the 
Sheffield Philosophy of Language Reading Group for comments on this critical study and related 
material.  I also thank the Sheffield Department of Philosophy and the AHRB for research leave to 
pursue the project of which this study is a part. 
